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Behavioral Finance before Kahneman
Richard A. Posner*
Although the psychologist Daniel Kahneman has had a profound
effect on economics, including the field of applied economics usually
called “law and economics” (the application of economics to law), I
don’t think he’s responsible for the fundamental insights into the
psychology of financial markets. We owe those insights to economists,
such as Frank Knight, John Maynard Keynes, Robert Shiller, and
Andrei Shleifer. This is worth emphasizing lest it be thought that
economists have just awakened to the complexities of human
psychology and consequent limitations of the model of man as a rational
maximizer of his satisfactions. The model was long criticized as
presenting an unduly pessimistic picture of man as selfish, selfinterested, Darwinian. The criticism was moral. The criticism that the
model is unrealistic in neglecting psychology is different and is the
criticism that I focus on in this brief paper on “behavioral finance,” a
term for analyzing financial behavior with due awareness of the
psychological dimension of such behavior.1 The other contributors to
this Conference focus on the application of behavioral finance to
specific legal doctrine. I do not.
It is important to distinguish between what I’ll call the micro and
macro levels of finance as analyzed from a psychological perspective.
By the micro level I mean the day-to-day behavior of the
unsophisticated investor, who corresponds to the average consumer in
nonfinancial product and service markets and whose lack of
sophistication makes him prone to blunders and a prey to sharpies.2 At
that level, “investors follow the advice of financial gurus, fail to
diversify, actively trade stocks and churn their portfolios, sell winning

* Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of
Chicago Law School.
1. The ideas in this paper are drawn largely from my book THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST
DEMOCRACY (2010), especially Part 2, and from my book on economic analysis cited in the next
footnote.
2. The two paragraphs that follow are drawn from RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 15.5 (8th ed. 2011), but I do not indent the paragraphs or place quotation
around them because I have rearranged and altered the paragraphs, though the gist is unchanged.
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stocks and hold on to losing stocks thereby increasing their tax
liabilities, buy and sell actively and expensively managed mutual funds,
follow stock price patterns and other popular models.”3 All this has
long been known. But the behavioral finance literature finds that these
behaviors are systematic rather than random. Investors are more
reluctant to sell losing than winning stocks (“loss aversion”). For the
same reason they demand a higher premium for owning stocks relative
to bonds (because stocks have more downside risk than bonds and loss
aversion implies that downside risk weighs more heavily in the
investor’s decision than upside risk) than risk aversion would warrant,
given the possibility of reducing risk by means of diversification. And
because people have difficulty with probabilities and tend therefore not
to understand that “runs” are consistent with chance, they see patterns
where they do not exist and therefore give greater weight to stocks’
short-run performance—and to the short-run performance of money
managers—than is warranted.
Proponents of efficient-market theory, which posits rationality, would
while acknowledging pockets of irrational behavior by investors argue
that they are eliminated by arbitrage, that is, by spotting a misvaluation
of a stock or other financial instrument and, by trading, eliminating the
misvaluation. In fact these pockets are, and have to be, pervasive:
“because information is costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the
information that is available, since if it did, those who spent resources to
obtain it would receive no compensation.”4 Suppose that because of a
mistaken fondness for stock X over very similar stock Y, the price of X
rises relative to that of Y even though the expected returns to the two
stocks are the same. By selling X short and buying Y, an arbitrageur
makes a more or less guaranteed profit, since if the two stocks are
indeed close substitutes, a continued rise in the market price of X is
likely to be accompanied by a rise in the market value of Y, so that the
arbitrageur will make up in profits on Y what he will lose if, contrary to
his expectation, the price of X does not fall. If it does fall, his short
selling will be profitable, and he is unlikely to incur a commensurate
loss on Y, since Y was undervalued relative to X when it sold for less
(since the stocks are so similar). The existence of the close substitute
for X, namely Y, is what enables the arbitrageur to hedge, for without
that substitute his selling X short would be very risky, since he cannot
be certain that it is overvalued; more precisely, he cannot be certain that
3. See ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
FINANCE 10 (2000).
4. Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 405 (1980).
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the market will “wake up” and realize that it is overvalued.
But arbitrage cannot be depended on to eliminate these mistakes and
irrationalities because the arbitrageur often cannot hedge, and when he
cannot hedge arbitrage is extremely risky. He cannot hedge if there are
no good substitute securities for those he thinks overvalued or
undervalued. And even if there are, the market may not wake up in
time for the hedge to work. If the price of X keeps rising after the
arbitrageur has sold it short and bought Y, but Y does not rise at the
same time, he may suffer staggering losses before the two stock prices
finally converge. Since arbitrage is incomplete, investor irrationalities
persist and cause systematic deviations between stock price and
fundamental value.
Irrational investor behavior is also promoted by mutual funds,
brokers, and other securities professionals who see profit opportunities
in exploiting that behavior.
But behavioral finance is not limited to noting the presence of
irrationality in financial markets. Its broader aim is to be realistic about
how the people in those markets are apt to behave.5 So consider people
who trade stocks, as distinct from people who buy and hold them for the
long term. Traders are not primarily interested in the future corporate
earnings of the companies whose stock they’re trading; they’re
primarily interested in whether other traders think the stocks are likely
to rise or fall in value; and those other traders likewise are interested in
what still other traders think. A trader who thinks that many other
traders consider a stock undervalued has a good reason to buy it
whatever he may think the company’s future earnings likely to be.
Hence “momentum trading”—buying when others are buying, selling
when others are selling. This is derided as “herd behavior,” which may
seem irrational, but is not, and not only among the (other) animals. (If
you are an antelope, and you see the other antelopes suddenly start to
stampede, you are well advised to join them because they may well be
fleeing from a lion or other predator.) Momentum trading is rational
herd behavior when it is based on a rational conjecture about the
behavior of other traders, though it will sometimes reflect also or
instead the human tendency to see patterns where there aren’t any
(possibly because pattern spotting is an evolved human trait of great
value in most situations). But momentum trading is also dangerous for
the economy as a whole—it can give rise to asset-price bubbles. A
bubble is a disequilibrium event involving a steep increase in price that
5. The discussion in this paragraph and the following two paragraphs is adapted from
POSNER, supra note 2, § 15.6.
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persists for a significant time, cannot be explained by fundamentals,
and, after peaking, quickly gives way to a steep fall in price. The
bursting of a bubble can bring on a general economic crisis, as we
learned in 2008.
And here is another example of what seems but is not irrational
behavior in securities markets, though it has a psychological
component: Suppose the consensus of stock analysts is that the stock of
some company is undervalued. You’re a stock analyst and you
disagree; you think it’s overvalued. Will you recommend to your
customers that they sell the stock? Probably not, unless you’re either
extremely confident that you’re right or extremely bold. (Temperament
differs across people, and temperament influences action—especially
under uncertainty, where “objective” data cannot guide decision
reliably. More on uncertainty shortly.) For if you’re wrong, you’ll
stand out and be criticized. If despite your doubts you advise buying
the stock, and you are wrong, you are part of the herd—where
everybody is wrong, no one is to blame. Hence (depending on your
probability estimate), the decision that maximizes your expected income
may be to go with the herd despite your disbelief in the herd’s wisdom.
More than rational calculation is involved in herd behavior. Human
beings are social animals and tend therefore to be conformists. Social
animals are uncomfortable if they are at odds with the other members of
their social group. They don’t want to be rejected by their peers, to be
ostracized because they are “different.” The element of rational
calculation in conformity is realization that the cost of an error is lower
the more people who make the error. If you are right when everyone
else is wrong, you will be resented; if you are wrong when everyone
else is right you’ll be ridiculed. In either case you risk ostracism by
going against the flow. If instead you are right when everyone else is
right and wrong when everyone else is wrong, you do not stand out and
so do not risk being ostracized.
People don’t like being called Cassandras, prophets of doom,
naysayers, or even short sellers. They don’t like the trader who pricks
the stock bubble. “Pessimist” has a negative connotation, “optimist” a
positive one—especially in the American culture, with its admiration of
the “can do” mentality, the hearty handshake, the huckster.
It’s been observed that stock prices tend to dip at the end of each
quarter—a pattern that can’t be explained by changes in forecasted
corporate earnings or for that matter by momentum trading. What is
involved—a characteristic pattern in a market in which psychological
factors play a significant role—is exploitation. The end of the quarter
(or the year, which is the end of a quarter) is the usual time when a
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portfolio manager’s performance is reviewed by his clients or superiors.
If his portfolio contains a number of stocks that have fallen in value
during the quarter he will have some explaining to do; and rather than
have to do that he may decide to sell those losers before his quarterly
review. Uncertainty plays a role here because if portfolio managers
were good stock pickers, a manager wouldn’t have many losers to have
to try to explain away. But there are few good stock pickers.
Speaking of uncertainty brings me to the macro level of behavioral
finance, where uncertainty—more precisely the psychological effect of
uncertainty—plays a key role in understanding financial behavior.
In 1920, Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes independently
discovered or invented a pregnant distinction between “risk” and
“uncertainty.” In ordinary speech either word can include the other.
The distinction the two economists proposed was between an uncertain
future event to which a quantitative probability of occurring can be
attached (such as a 50 percent chance that it will rain tomorrow) (“risk”)
and an uncertain future event to which no such probability can be
attached (such as tomorrow I will be killed in a terrorist attack, or ten
years from now my wife will ask for a divorce) (“uncertainty”). The
former concept, risk, is more congenial to economic analysis than the
latter, uncertainty, because it enables (often in conjunction with
information about risk aversion or risk preference) the costs and
benefits of uncertain future events to be estimated, and optimal behavior
in regard to those events to be selected. If one knows the cost of a
precaution that will avert an accident, the cost to a victim of the
accident if the accident occurs, and the probability that the accident will
occur unless the precaution is taken, one can calculate the efficient
course of action—whether to take the precaution or not.
Uncertainty is intractable to cost-benefit analysis. The “rational”
response to uncertainty—the optimal response of a rational utility
maximizer—cannot be calculated. Yet it is obvious that uncertainty is a
pervasive feature of the human environment and influences human
action. Keynes, who was both an experienced speculator in the stock
market and a foremost analyst of the worldwide depression of the
1930s, emphasized the effect of uncertainty both in stock markets and in
business cycles. Take the second first. Suppose, as with the stock
market crash of October 1929 or the credit collapse of September 2008,
there is a large, sudden, steep, unexpected, but unquestionably negative
event the impact of which is felt throughout the economy. No one
knows how grave or how protracted the impact will be, how sudden the
descent, how quick or slow the recovery; it is a situation of uncertainty.
One response to uncertainty that is common to most economic actors,
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whether producers or consumers, is to freeze. The impulse is natural.
Not knowing how bad the economic environment has become, one is
hardly minded to make loans or investments, hire more workers, borrow
more money, or increase personal consumption expenditures, as those
steps, unless miraculously taken by all or most people and firms all at
once, will reduce (though by an unmeasurable percentage—because we
are in the domain of uncertainty) the welfare of the person or firm that
invests or produces or consumes. By freezing, one tries to preserve the
status quo in the hope that time will bring information, enabling the
correct response to be determined. It is a matter of looking before one
leaps.
Freezing may be sensible, but it is not a product of calculation. What
actuates freezing is fear, specifically fear of the unknown. If you know
exactly how fast and how far the economy, or the part of the economy
that critically affects you, will plummet, you may be angry and
depressed, but you will not be paralyzed, because you will know what’s
happening and determine a course of action accordingly. If you don’t
know what to do, you might as well do nothing until you learn more.
Keynes is again the guide in explaining the kind of behavior that can
give rise to bubbles. I have already touched on this, noting that the
price of stocks traded on an exchange is a function of the buy and sell
decisions of a large number of traders, but that while some of these
traders just buy when they have cash to invest and sell when they need
cash for consumption or to pay debts, others speculate, buying when
they think the price of a stock (or of most stocks) will rise and selling
when they think the opposite will happen. Since prices are driven by
the decisions of the bulk of the traders, one trader’s guess about whether
price will rise or fall is a guess about the behavior of the other traders,
whose behavior in turn is a function of their expectations of whether
other traders (such as yourself) will buy or sell the stock or stocks in
question. (So you will have to try to figure out not only how they will
react to your trades, but how their reactions will be shaped by their
guesses as to how you will react to their reactions to your trades.)
Sometimes there will have been an external event the consequences of
which are so predictable that all the traders will react the same way, but
when that happens it is very difficult to make any money because it will
be difficult to find anyone on the other side of a buy or sell order. Thus
most speculative trading will occur under uncertainty.
This explains the bubble phenomenon that erupts from time to time in
stock markets, as in the dot-com bubble of the late 1990s, and in other
markets as well, such as the housing market in the early 2000s. A
bubble occurs when prices rise steeply for a protracted, unbroken
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period. Many traders decide to sell, and pocket their winnings, fearing
the price is indeed a bubble and wanting to get out of the market before
the bubble bursts. But there will be plenty of buyers, including many
who also think the rising price is a bubble phenomenon, because they
don’t know when the bubble will burst and hope it still has far to
expand before that happens. Psychology enters here because of the
human tendency to extrapolate—to infer a trend from recent
experience—a tendency that is especially likely to operate in a situation
of uncertainty because there is then nothing else to go on. If the price
trend is upward, there is a feeling, irrational as it is, that it will continue
trending upward, at least for a time. Finally enough traders become
fearful for a sell off to occur, and a downward spiral to succeed the
upward spiral that was the bubble.
Neither the fear that can intensify the freeze response to negative
uncertainty, nor the extrapolation tendency that exacerbates uncertainty,
is a rational response to uncertainty. But the actual response cannot be
understood without bringing those psychological influences into play.
Of course there will be smart traders who realize that a recent rise in
the price of stocks (or houses, or other assets) may be a bubble
phenomenon. They may sell short in the hope of cashing in when the
bubble bursts. But as I noted earlier short selling often is costly, as well
as risky. The short seller who borrows shares of stock in order to be
able to honor his agreement to sell them will incur interest costs for an
extended period, waiting for the price to drop so that he can buy cheap
the shares he’s agreed to sell and return the borrowed shares. So short
selling is not a sure bubble pricker—if it were, there would be no asset
bubbles.

